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Abstract—Deciding privacy-type properties of deterministic
cryptographic protocols such as anonymity and strong secrecy
can be reduced to deciding the symbolic equivalence of processes,
where each process is described by a set of possible symbolic
traces. This equivalence is parameterized by a deduction system
that describes which actions and observations an intruder can
perform on a running system.
We present in this paper a notion of finitary deduction systems.
For this class of deduction system, we first reduce the problem of
the equivalence of processes with no disequations to the resolution
of reachability problem on each symbolic trace of one process,
and then testing whether each solution found is solution of a
related trace in the other process. We then extend this reduction
to the case of generic deterministic finite processes in which
symbolic traces may contain disequalities.
Index Terms—Cryptographic protocols; formal methods; pri-
vacy analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Context. Security protocols, i.e. protocols in which the
messages are cryptographically secured, are a cornerstone of
security in distributed applications. The need for optimizing
resource utilization and their distributed nature make their
design error prone, and formal methods have been applied
successfully to detect errors in the past [1]–[4].
Formal models of cryptographic protocols usually present
the reader with a dichotomy between the honest agents—
translated into a constraint system [5]–[7], clause sets with
a subset dedicated to the modeling of honest agents [4],
[8] or frames [9], [10]—, and the attacker—modeled by a
deduction system expressing its possible actions. In contrast
the representation with symbolic derivation [11] unifies the
honest and dishonest agent models, where agents may perform
deductions, nonce creation, tests, and communication actions.
Intuition. First, a trivial remark: since one can construct
deduction systems for which reachability is decidable but static
equivalence is not [10]. Thus being able to decide reachability
does not imply being able to decide static equivalence, which
is a special case of process equivalence. However in e.g. [3],
[6], [12] reachability is reduced to the satisfiability of a
constraint system in a bounded number of steps. That problem
is decided using constraint transformation rules. A solved form
is defined as a constraint system in which the attacker just
has to instantiate variables by any term he can construct. In
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practice, the proof of completeness of the procedure consists
in assuming the existence of a sequence of deduction steps
that satisfies the constraint system, and in proving that as long
as one such sequence exists, either the constraint system is in
solved form or there exists a transformation rule applicable
on the constraint system. Then, one proves that there is no
infinite sequence of transformations and that each constraint
system not in solved form has only a finite number of possible
successors. König’s lemma then implies termination of the
procedure. The original constraint system is unsatisfiable if
and only if the set of leaves in solved form is empty.
Such procedures do much more than simply deciding reach-
ability, as they end with a (possibly empty) set of constraint
systems in solved form that, as long as the completeness proof
is along the lines given above, covers all possible attacks.
Formalizing this argument is not trivial, since:
• not all instances of the variables occurring in a constraint
system in solved form correspond to attacks; and
• to test the equivalence of two protocols we need to
account for the equality tests the attacker can perform
to analyze the responses of the honest agents.
We have bypassed the first difficulty by imposing that the
attacker instantiates the first-order variables in a constraint
system in solved form with intruder-generated constants, and
proved that replacing these constants by any possible con-
struction yields another attacks. This replacement is formalized
by a well-founded ordering on the possible attacks, the ones
in solved form being minimal for this ordering. For finitary
deduction systems the set of minimal attacks is always finite.
We solve the second difficulty by proving that it suffices to
consider an attacker testing at most one equality on the result
of his interaction with the honest process when this test is
chosen before the computation of solved forms.
Simmetrically we account for disequalities in the process
modeling the honest agents by introducing an equality chosen
in a finite set before solving the constraint system.
Related works. Proofs of equivalence of processes are
notoriously difficult, even when only finite processes are
considered. In [13] Hüttel proves decidability for a fragment
of the spi-calculus—i.e. for the Dolev-Yao model—for single
trace processes. This result was extended by Baudet [14] in
the same process setting but for subterm convergent equational
theories. This result was extended in [8] for processes with
several branches but no default case, i.e. without disequalities.
Another line of work starting from Hüttel focused on
simple primitives but aimed at considering more complex
processes. Among these we only consider those dealing with
bounded processes, thereby misrepresenting ProVerif’s [4]
diff-equivalence by casting it in the world of bounded pro-
cesses where it is too strong. An historical difficulty has
been to find a satisfactory equivalence notion given a process
algebra, e.g. applied-π calculus [15], spi-calculus [16], or psi-
calculus [17]. It was latter proved in [18] that for deterministic
processes labelled bisimilarity is equivalent to trace equiva-
lence. This motivates us to shy away from complex process
algebra and a translation to sets of traces, and define instead
directly deterministic processes as sets of traces. In a similar
setting but only for Dolev-Yao cryptographic primitives, [19]
proved decidability of deterministic process equivalence.
In this paper we prove decidability of process equivalence
for a class of deduction systems that at least [20] includes
those with a subterm convergent equational theory as in [8]
for processes that include disequalities as in [19]. Further work
is needed to ellicit how large this class actually is.
Example finitary deduction systems. We remark that the
standard Dolev-Yao deduction system [21] is finitary, since
for every attack one can guess a subsequence of deduction
steps which is itself an attack [22]. Deduction systems whose
equational theory is subterm convergent are also finitary (see
e.g. [20] though other articles considering these theories also
include an argument that all attacks are representated).
Organization of this paper. Given this is a short version
we have decided to provide a reference to the submitted
version [23] and to only give in this paper a non-technical
description in the hope that this will incite the brave reader to
read the referenced version. Accordingly we follow the same
organisation to ease the reading. Also we hope that this shorten
format may help distinguish the original contribution that is
not in the unpublished report [24].
We reuse in this paper the classical notions and notations
for terms, equational theories, deduction systems recalled in
Sec. II-A. We present the less known notion of symbolic
derivation and finitary deduction systems in Sec. II-B. Equiv-
alence of deterministic processes in our setting is defined in
Sec. II-D and its decidability for finitary deduction systems is
described first in the case of processes without disequalities,
then in the general case. We conclude in Sec. III.
II. PROCEDURE OUTLINE
This results builds on [24] in which a procedure computing
whether two sequences of actions, called symbolic derivations,
are equivalent assuming the observer is defined by a finitary
deduction system. We refer to [23] for a longer version of
this paper that includes the technical details necessary for
comprehension.
A. Basic foundations
We represent values with terms describing how these can
be constructed from a set of arbitrary values–the constants–
with the application of functions. For example, using the well-
known LISP list functions some values can be represented by
the terms nil, cons(1,nil), car(cons(1,nil)). Traditionally the
car function maps a couple to its first member. Thus the last
value is also equal, more simply, to 1. The valid equalities
are defined by an equational theory, a set of axioms of the
form l = r together with the axioms defining the equality as
a congruence over values. In the preceding example we have
assumed the axiom car(cons(x, l)) = x.
Unification is concerned with the resolution of equations
entailed by an equational theory. A set of equations is unifiable
if its variables can be instantiated by values such that all
equations are entailed by the equational theory. One possible
instantiation is called a unifier, and may contain variables. To
proceed with the example, the mapping {x → cons(y,z)} is a
unifier of the equation car(x)= y modulo the equational theory.
It is even a most general unifier (mgu) of this equation: one
can check that any unifier is an instance of this unifier. The
existence of a set of a set of most general unifiers is not guar-
anteed. Even when such a set exists, it may be infinite. For the
equational theory on word, x ·ε = x,ε ·x= y,x ·(y ·z) = (x ·y) ·z,
the equation a ·x= x ·a admits all the unifiers {x → an|n∈N},
but this set cannot be described by the instances of a finite
set of mgus. An equational theory is finitary if every set of
equations has a finite (and possibly empty) set of mgus.
B. Symbolic derivations
We denote an execution of a process with symbolic deriva-
tions [25]. These are labeled sequences of values in which
each value in the sequence is either in the initial memory
of the process, received, copied from a preceding occurrence,
constructed by the application of a function, or an arbitrary
constant. Furthermore an occurrence of a value can be pub-
lished, i.e. sent. A unification system records these constraints
among the values.
Symbolic derivations are combined by identifying the pub-
lished occurrences of one with the received occurrences of
the other–and removing the reception label–to create a new
symbolic derivation. In this model a realisable execution is
modeled by a symbolic derivation in which all reception labels
have been removed, called closed symbolic derivations and in
which the unification system is satisfied by the values.
Among symbolic derivations we single out those defining
the possible actions of an active attacker as those in which
the initial knowledge only contains constants selected to
represent random values. This setting is analoguous to the
resolution of sets of equations modulo an equational theory.
For satisfiability, a set of equation plays the same role wrt its
unifiers that instantiante it to produce equations entailed by the
equational theory as a symbolic derivations plays wrt to the
attacker symbolic derivations that they can be combined with
to form closed symbolic derivations whose unification system
is satisfiable. This set of atacker symbolic derivations is called
the set of solutions of the symbolic derivation.
There are however a few caveat to this analogy that are
addressed in [23], [24]:
• Variables in sets of equations play the same role in this
analogy as received values. However to ensure that the
attacker indeed can interact with the symbolic derivation,
we must ensure that the reception labels are removed.
This problem is solved in [24], [25] by introducing an
opening operation using which the constants in a solution
can be re-used to allow for the combination with a new
symbolic derivation;
• The solutions are quantified over all sequences of values
and over all unification systems that represent tests that
the attacker may apply on the results of his interaction
with the symbolic derivation. This situation is resolved
in [24], [25] by spliting attacker symbolic derivations in
a pure deduction part, a well-formed derivation and a pure
testing part, a testing derivation, that is latter connected
using the opening operation.
The set of solutions of a symbolic derivation C is denoted
C . The subset of well-formed solutions is denoted C sf, and
for a closed symbolic derivation C . Two symbolic derivations
are equivalent if and only if they have the same set of solutions.
A deduction system is defined by the set of operations the at-
tacker can employ together with the equational theory defining
the effects of these operations. We say that a deduction system
D is finitary if for every symbolic derivation C the set C  can
be described by a finite set of symbolic derivations min<(C ).
The lack of technical details hides again two caveats:
• attacker symbolic derivations in min<(C ) also must be
solutions of C , for otherwise just instantiating the ex-
pected received values with constants would provide a
meaningless description;
• also, since there is an unbounded number of constants,
we need a pre-ordering on solutions to capture symbolic
derivations that are instance one of the other (the strict
ordering part) and one of another (the equivalence classes
for the pre-ordering)
The resolution of these difficulties is presented in [23], [24].
C. Equivalence of processes
This part is novel and not present in [24]. We present in this
section and in the next one how to reduce the problem of the
equivalence of two processes to the problem of equivalence
of two symbolic derivations, and how to take into account
disequations as in [19] but for a more general class of
deduction systems.
Since we assume finite processes, we identify processes
with the set of symbolic derivations that correspont to finite
forward executions. An observational relation is employed to
restrict the symbolic derivations of the other process to which
a symbolic derivation of one can potentially be identified. This
relation is a pre-observational equivalence in the sense that any
symbolic derivation in a process and any attacker trace which
is in its solution set, there must exist a related trace in the other
process which has that attacker trace in its solution set. Though
it is superficially similar to the biprocess construction of [4]
note that two different solutions of one symbolic derivation
of one process can be solutions of two different symbolic
derivations of the other process.
Finally we consider the containment problem of two pro-
cesses, and define that two processes are equivalent if they
are contained one in the other for the same observational
relation R. The reduction of process equivalence to process
containment is trivial.
Definition 1. (D-Containment) Let P1,P2 be two processes
and let R be an observational relation such that R(P1,P2). We
say that P1 is D-contained in P2, and denote it P1 RD P2, if
C1
 ⊆ ∪1≤i≤nC2,i for all C1 ∈ P1.
D. Decidability of containment
1) Processes without disequalities: In the case of processes
without disequalities, the procedure is straightforward. For
each possible execution, we first guess an additional test that
the attack will perform on his interaction with the execution
(Ct ) and on which terms it will be performed (Ch◦Ct ). By [24]
and if performed for all possible tests (one for each function),
this test is sufficient to prove that all instances of a minimal
solution of Ch are solutions of the other symbolic derivation.
We have adapted it to prove that all solutions of Ch are
solutions of one of the related symbolic derivation.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for solving process containment.
procedure D -PROCESS CONTAINMENT(P1,P2,R)
Input: P1,P2 processes, R an observational relation
Output: SAT if (P1,D1)RD (P2,D2).
For all Ch ∈ P1
For all Ct testing with one deduction and one
equality
let Σ =min<(Ch ◦Ct)sf,D1(Ch)
For all C ∈ Σ
if there does not exist C ′h such that R(Ch,C
′
h)
and C ∈ (C ′h ◦Ct)






2) Processes with disequalities: Algorithm 2 is slightly
more involved and adds a level of quantification. When testing
a solution of a symbolic derivation Ch in P1, we have to
consider all related symbolic derivations C ′h in P2 and for each
guess a disequality that can be satisfied by an instance of the
solution. Only if there is no such C ′h can we conclude that all
instances of the solution are solutions of one of the related
C ′h.
III. CONCLUSION
We have introduced in this paper the notion of finitary
deduction systems, and proved that symbolic equivalence is
decidable for such attacker models. We believe that definition
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for solving extended process contain-
ment.
procedure D -PROCESS CONTAINMENT(P1,P2,R)
Input: P1 = (P1,D1),P2 = (P2,D2) extended pro-
cesses, R an observational relation
Output: SAT if (P1,D1)RD (P2,D2).
For all Ch ∈ P1
For all Ct testing with one deduction and one
equality
let Σ =min<(Ch ◦Ct)sf,D1(Ch)
For all C ∈ Σ
If there does not exist C ′h such that R(Ch,C
′
h)
and C ∈ (Ch ◦Ct) and, for every l = r ∈ D2, the HSD










also captures the essence of lazy intruder techniques that
are employed in many tools. In further work we aim at
implementing this procedure to assess its practical feasability.
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